



Finally, we recapitulate and conclude by noting some implications of the habit ontology of SR for political thought (5). This discloses a perspective on the role of SR in enabling both social domination and transformation (4). We then go on to show how SR thus conceived can help explicate its role in the production of persons, the maintenance of social groups and even in the reproduction of society (3). We sketch out an account of SR that hinges on Dewey’s concept of habituation, which can be characterized as a spiral of second and first nature (2). To this aim, we introduce Dewey’s social ontology. We will start by outlining the current feminist debates around SR and showing where and to what extent this fundamental notion is left in need of further conceptualization (1). Habit is a leading concept in Dewey’s social ontology, whose basic problem is precisely, we argue, to explain the more or less creative and transformative reproduction of social phenomena. We intend to contribute to a theory of SR by reconstructing and drawing upon John Dewey’s habit ontology.
